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ABSTRACT
This paper describes a new Internet access paradigm based
on Lowest Cost Denominator Networking - the Public Access
WiFi Service (PAWS) - that utilises the unused capacity of
home broadband connections and provides users who are
unable to afford paying for the service with Less-than-Best-
Effort access to these resources. We identify the security and
architectural challenges faced by the project and propose
our solution that enables free internet connectivity to public
services for the local community, in a secure and scalable
manner.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [General]: Security and protection; C.2.1 [Network
Architecture and Design]: Wireless communication;
C.2.3 [Network Operations]: Public networks
Keywords
Less Than Best Effort Networks, Security, Community Net-
works
1. INTRODUCTION
The Public Access WiFi Service (PAWS)[7] aims to en-
able digital inclusion of under-privileged members of society
through ensuring secure access for all to everyday online ser-
vices. These are currently enjoyed by the majority but are
typically not accessible to those who come from poorer back-
grounds and deprived areas. Ensuring that all members of
society are able to participate fully in the Digital Economy
is a significant step towards improving social equality.
Related initiatives in the past have assumed that all users
of the Wireless Community Networks are either sharers
(share their bandwidth with other users) or pay to become
users. Companies such as FON [4] have been very success-
ful in attracting a large community of users, with 8 million
FON hotspots currently available. This demonstrates that
broadband customers are willing to volunteer to share their
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high-speed broadband Internet connection for free with fel-
low citizens. Since we are considering those do not currently
have access to these services, we are likely to have many vul-
nerable internet users. We argue that it is essential to pro-
vide easy-to-use service with better-than-average security to
them.
2. REQUIREMENTS
Inspired by Lowest Cost Denominator Networking [6],
PAWS provides free internet services to users over a wire-
less network that they neither own nor can control. The
majority of PAWS users will come from digitally-excluded
background and so we need to provide better-than-average
security for them. We are therefore faced with some interest-
ing security and infrastructure challenges that our solution
must address:
• Confidentiality: Users need to be able to access the
internet securely without worrying about the possibil-
ity that the sharers or other users on the network may
eavesdrop on their traffic. PAWS users must be pro-
tected from either other PAWS users connected to the
same hotspot or from any other wireless users within
reach. As all PAWS user traffic is routed through
equipment located inside sharers’ homes, to which
sharers have full access, the PAWS user traffic needs to
be reliably protected from interception or eavesdrop-
ping.
• Ease-of-Use: Without any special training, users
need to reliably use a secure connection and sharers
need to be able to set up the PAWS hotspot.
• Priority: Sharers’ internet use must not be noticeably
affected by sharing their connection with the PAWS
network.
• Authentication, Authorisation & Accounting:
The PAWS project need to be able to control which
users are allowed to access what services, how much
of the resources to use and to be able provide detailed
record of services accessed and resource usage.
• Scalability: The PAWS network must be scalable
across deployment areas.
3. PROPOSAL
Our proposal is designed to achieve secure end to end net-
work access over unsecured network infrastructure. We re-
alise this by enabling users to connect to a dedicated PAWS
WiFi router on the sharer’s network and on top of this con-
nection establish a secure VPN tunnel from the user’s device
to the PAWS VPN service, using federated identity manage-
ment. We describe our approach in more detail below.
Hotspot Deployment
PAWS works by using a separate dedicated router connected
via Ethernet to the sharer’s domestic router so that no fur-
ther set-up is required.
Alternatively we could connect the PAWS router directly
to the sharer’s internet connection and then connect the
sharer’s router to the PAWS router, this would have the ad-
vantage that we can accurately measure the sharer’s network
usage and therefore infer the unused capacity that could be
made available to the PAWS network. However, this would
not work for many reasons: The PAWS router would have to
work as a modem therefore would have to be configured and
suitable for all ISPs and connection methods (fiber, ADSL,
etc.). Many ISPs will not provide support if the router they
provide is not used and thus would create another barrier
for volunteers. The original router would have to be recon-
figured so as to no longer act as a modem requiring guides
available for PAWS sharers.
FON [4] uses a dedicated router (”La Fonera”), which is
connected behind the sharer’s modem but then the sharer
uses the FON box as their AP for their home network. This
is not a feasible option for us as it requires the sharer to
connect all their devices to the new AP. Existing works [1]
[2] implement this purely in client side software; it is not a
suitable solution due to the range of devices that we intend
to support.
We deploy PAWS Access Points in volunteers’ houses, ad-
vertising an open WiFi network with ”PAWS” SSID. The
PAWS Access Points are configured to use only a fraction of
the sharers’ bandwidth so that sharers’ internet use is not
noticeably affected. The users’ devices connect to the PAWS
advertised network.
Confidentially
As outlined in the requirements above PAWS user traffic
needs to be reliably protected both while wireless and while
being routed through sharers’ homes.
While WiFi encryption is typically considered to be the
obvious option for securing the wireless traffic between the
user device and the PAWS wireless router, it cannot reliably
provide the required level of confidentiality. Existing re-
search shows that the majority of available WiFi encryption
algorithms such as WEP, WPA, WPA2, are not sufficiently
secure. Arguably one of the latest encryption algorithms
such as WPA2-Enterprise should be able to offer adequate
encryption, however the WiFi networks suffer from a major
drawback as they are designed to provide security against
outsiders but not among insiders. WPA2 can perform sat-
isfactorily against users who do not have a valid password
and cannot associate legitimately to the network SSID, but
it does not prevent already associated users from eavesdrop-
ping on newly associating users’ initial handshakes and in-
tercepting their keys.
In home or enterprise environments this is little cause for
concern as it can be assumed that sufficient degree of trust
exists among connected users.
In the case of PAWS, no trust can be assumed among
users, and ensuring users associated with the same network
SSID cannot eavesdrop on each-other’s traffic is a major
confidentiality requirement.
The second confidentiality requirement is ensuring that
sharers cannot eavesdrop on PAWS users traffic. The PAWS
WiFi routers are connected to the sharers’ routers and all
PAWS users traffic can be eavesdropped at this point [5].
The sharers also have physical access to the PAWS WiFi
routers and there is nothing that we can practically do
to prevent them from taking over these routers. Even if
the sharers lack technical expertise to obtain administrator-
level privileges to the PAWS WiFi routers, they can easily
turn them off and advertise the ”PAWS” SSID via their own
routers.
Encrypting sensitive traffic at the PAWS users’ devices
addresses the confidentiality requirements listed above but
PAWS users cannot be assumed to be able to do this them-
selves.
We, therefore, propose to use a VPN tunnel between the
PAWS users’ end devices and a secure endpoint, so that user
traffic is not vulnerable while traversing the unsecured link.
The VPN servers for the PAWS network are located near
to each geographical area that the PAWS network is de-
ployed, to minimise latency. Each PAWS VPN server could
be funded by the local council or charities.
We have designed the VPN servers to provide the L2TP
and PPTP protocol implementations because they offer the
best trade-off between security, ease of set-up, and built-in
device and OS support. Most computers and mobile devices
have built-in support for L2TP and PPTP which is a ma-
jor benefit for the PAWS targeted user-base. More secure
VPN protocols and implementations exist but they require
additional installation and complicated configuration.
Authentication, Authorisation, Accounting
As highlighted in the requirement section, we need authenti-
cation, authorization and accounting for the users connect-
ing to public services via the PAWS network. We have cho-
sen RADIUS network protocol because it is popular and is
well supported by a wide range of operating systems and
devices.
We configured the PAWS router firewall to only allow con-
trol protocols and traffic to the local PAWS VPN server for
two reasons. First the user initiates a VPN session to the
local PAWS VPN server and provides their PAWS creden-
tials. The VPN server checks the credentials with the local
RADIUS instance that confirms if the user has been authen-
ticated and is authorised to establish a VPN session.
In the case that the PAWS RADIUS server uses exter-
nal RADIUS servers (e.g. Government, Council, Library,
Bus Operator) for authentication, the PAWS authentication
server proxies the request to the external server. The ex-
ternal RADIUS server confirms the password validity. The
RADIUS Authentication Server completes the VPN session,
authorises the client and starts acting as a router to the
Wireless Client. The user can now access the internet. This
is shown in Figure 1 (Nottingham).
Our infrastructure is highly scalable and can efficiently
manage user mobility, roaming and federated identity man-
agement utilising the forwarding of authentication requests
by RADIUS to another RADIUS server (Figure 1). Consider
a case when a Nottingham PAWS user travels to Manch-
ester and connects to a Manchester sharer’s PAWS router
and provides their PAWS username (using the RADIUS for-
mat ”user@Nottingham”) and password to the Manchester
PAWS VPN server. The Manchester PAWS VPN Server for-
PAWS 
Router
VPN 
Server
RADIUS 
Server
Nottingham
External
RADIUS 
Server
User 
Device
PAWS 
Router
VPN 
Server
RADIUS 
Server
London
External
RADIUS 
Server
User 
Device
PAWS 
Router
VPN 
Server
RADIUS 
Server
Manchester
External
RADIUS 
Server
User 
Device
User 
Device
1
2 3
4
5
67
8
123
4 7
5
6
8 9 10
Figure 1: Federated Authentication
wards the username and password to the Manchester PAWS
RADIUS server for authentication. The Manchester PAWS
RADIUS Server determines, based on the Realm in the user-
name, that it needs to proxy the authentication request
to the Nottingham PAWS RADIUS Server. The Notting-
ham PAWS RADIUS Server responds back to the Manch-
ester PAWS RADIUS server and confirms the username and
password are authorised. The Manchester PAWS RADIUS
server forwards the confirmation to the Manchester PAWS
VPN server. The Manchester PAWS VPN server confirms
to the client that the username and password are correct
and proceeds with establishing the PAWS VPN connection.
4. DISCUSSION
Current laws controlling the sharing of wireless internet
access are hindering the digital economy and the digital
social inclusion plans of Governments [3] [9] because they
refuse to recognize the novelty of socially transformative
technology. For example many ISPs currently specify in
their terms and conditions that they shall be entitled to
terminate the Service if they discover that customers have
permitted (whether knowingly or not) a third party to access
the Service using a wireless connection over their communi-
cations line.
The law should be clarified to help spread broadband ac-
cess more widely. At present many theories of law exist
that are trying to address the problem of internet sharing
regulation but they are still not managing to fuse their un-
derstanding of human, technological, and business aspects of
internet regulations [3]. They aim to achieve one coherent
theory that would offer a flexible, responsive and effective
regulatory model for bandwidth sharing in cyberspace. We
argue that the impact of the introduction of community net-
works on the primary traffics needs to be studied further in
order to be fully understood. Virtual Public Networks [8]
addresses many of the challenges faced by PAWS, whilst also
allowing third party stakeholders as ISPs.
5. FUTURE WORK
At present the PAWS project has active deployments in a
digitally deprived area in Nottingham. Further deployments
to explore other applications will take place with funding
from the DE dot.rural 1 Research Hub at Aberdeen Univer-
sity.
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